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BLD-274

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 17-1759
___________
DAVE WILLIAMS,
Appellant
v.
DR. B. JIN
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2:15-cv-00855)
District Judge: Honorable Nora B. Fischer
____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 8, 2017
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 14, 2017)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

In this civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Dave Williams, a
prisoner at SCI-Greene who is proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granting the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment and denying his motion for partial summary judgment.
Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm.
In his complaint, Williams alleged that Dr. Byunghak Jin, the medical director at
SCI-Greene, violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to adequately treat a right
inguinal hernia. Williams first complained about the hernia in May 2011.1 Dr. Jin
examined Williams and concluded that the hernia was easily reducible, instructed him
about how to manage it, and indicated that he should be reevaluated in one year. On
December 30, 2011, Williams appeared at sick call and was examined by the attending
physician, Dr. Park, who concluded that Williams’ hernia was sagging into his scrotum.
Accordingly, Dr. Park recommended that Williams be referred to Dr. Jin to discuss
surgery. On January 5, 2012, Dr. Jin examined Williams, noted that the hernia was
reducible and small in size, and ordered Williams to wear a hernia strap for six months.
Williams received the hernia strap on January 9, 2012. On April 24, 2012, Williams
reported that the hernia strap had broken, but he was provided with a replacement on May
2, 2012. On July 16, 2012, Williams appeared at sick call and complained that the hernia

1

In April 2007, Williams had surgery to repair a left inguinal hernia. At a follow-up
appointment approximately one week later, the surgeon noted that Williams might have a
“small right inguinal hernia,” which could require more surgery pro re nata (as needed).
2

had not improved. Although the record does not indicate what treatment Williams
received at that time, he did not seek additional care for his hernia until February 2013,
when he sought and received a renewal of his hernia strap prescription. In April 2014,
Williams appeared at sick call and complained that the renewed hernia strap was too big.
A physician’s assistant exchanged the strap for a smaller one, noting that Williams “was
in no acute distress and that he stated that he was not in any pain.” In January 2015, a
physician’s assistant examined Williams, who complained about the hernia and asked
about surgery. The physician’s assistant noted that Williams’ hernia was reducible and
advised him to continue wearing the strap. In April 2015, Dr. Jin noted that Williams
still had the hernia, renewed Williams’s hernia strap, and indicated that the hernia was
self-reducing through use of the strap.
Williams filed his complaint in July 2015. Dr. Jin filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that the evidence demonstrated that Williams received regular and
appropriate treatment. After a review of the summary judgment record, a Magistrate
Judge recommended that Dr. Jin’s summary judgment motion be granted because
Williams did not adduce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.
Over Williams’ objections, the District Court granted summary judgment to Dr. Jin and
denied Williams’ motion for partial summary judgment. Williams appealed.

Williams’ complaint does not appear to challenge the treatment he received for the left
inguinal hernia.
3

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District
Court’s order is plenary. See Wiest v. Tyco Elecs. Corp., 812 F.3d 319, 327-28 (3d Cir.
2016). Summary judgment is proper where, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418,
422-23 (3d Cir. 2006). We may summarily affirm a decision of the District Court if the
appeal does not raise a substantial question. 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim for the denial or delay of medical
care, Williams is required to demonstrate that Dr. Jin was deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-05 (1976). Deliberate
indifference can be shown by a prison official’s “intentionally denying or delaying access
to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Id. at
104-05. Allegations of medical malpractice are not sufficient to establish a constitutional
violation. White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1990). Furthermore, “mere
disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” does not support a claim of an Eighth
Amendment violation. Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346
(3d Cir. 1987).
It is clear from the record that Williams received timely and adequate medical
attention when he complained about the right inguinal hernia. The undisputed medical
records demonstrate that Dr. Jin, pursuant to his professional judgment, tailored
4

Williams’ treatment to his symptoms. Williams’ disagreement with the treatment is
insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235
(3d Cir. 2004). Williams did not present any evidence from which a reasonable juror
could conclude that Dr. Jin intentionally refused to provide needed treatment, delayed
necessary treatment for a non-medical reason, prevented Williams from receiving
required treatment, or persisted in a particular course of treatment “in the face of resultant
pain and risk of permanent injury.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)
(quoting White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109-11 (3d Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, the
District Court properly granted Dr. Jin’s motion for summary judgment. See Johnson v.
Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1014 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming District Court determination
that using hernia belt for reducible inguinal hernia did not constitute deliberate
indifference).
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there is no substantial question
presented by this appeal, and will thus summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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